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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action to review a final order of 
the Industrial Commission of Utah denying Plaintiff 
workmen's compensation benefits under the statutory 
Combined Special Injury Fund. 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
After a finding and award by the Commission 
holding Plaintiff has a 100% permanent impairment of 
his body and mind resulting from all causes and con-
ditions, including a 15% permanent partial loss of 
body function attributable to injuries sustained by 
Plaintiff in an industrial accident, in the course of 
employment, at Geneva Steel Plant July 23, 1972, the 
Commission ruled that Plaintiff's 15% disability does 
not entitle him to Combined Special Injury Fund bene-
fits even though Plaintiff was found to be 100% per-
manently and totally disabled. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
Plaintiff filed this Writ of Review seeking 
reversal of the Commission's Order and a ruling by 
this Court that Plaintiff is entitled to the benefits 
established by the Combined Special Injury Fund. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Plaintiff w<*s employed r^  United ctateo 
Steel at its Geneva Plr rn-
: ' ivp engineer since i946. He had r; jr.i^trir-L 
a c c i d e n t s - , '• - i*> '** * -ie haa <~ 
• . •- -n v* -i f> •" 1 j f £
 # 
On J a n u a r y >4, I^Mi# P l a i n t i f f was o p e r a t i n g 
a l o c o m o t i v e engir*-
»j y:ift\ cmqlne w^»c . t i .ei employee ••_„ i - i i r r o i -
o p e r a t i n g * P a i n t e r was r e p r i m a n d e d T ; v- ],i r e s n o n • 
s i b l e i t " " / , 
i :< i ;nL j f i : , s head va.:; nv* ' ' *: window and h e 
h i t li • - - .<: . f r a m e . He n o t e d - - ' * -•*•-
com) " * .-*. f.v j . : r e a t e d conse i -
v a t i v e l y a t t h e Company d i s p e n s a r y J a n u a r y 3 1 , 1966 
f o r p a i n i n t h e neck and on sover. i I! m v u r e n c t i y I., h e r e - '. 
a f t e r . 
F l a l n t i f : :? c o n d i t i o n became p r o g r e s s i v e ] v 
worse :.n«' -r. Ar-
 t x r v i -al 
fusij :* J v -». i.^M*. . i n i s SIMM* ^ - . -peri -
t l v e l y , -ie improved and \%-^  r e l e a s e d LU r e a 3 
u s u a l < f ncr ine^r on F e b r u a r y i 
19 7T
 Xl . - , I ' L a i n n t f s u c c e s s f u l l y p e r f o r m e d a s « 
3 
ivp engineer from February IS, 1Q72 until the 
industrial accident of July 23», l1"**??
 M i ' i IJIMM 
three heavy nil ai/1'.i1 I«J I lirud car . 1 \ I Jed wi th flue 
dust collided with a locomotive engine of a train 
being driven by Plaintiff. Thin nipd d I hrow him 
KI'OW, uit (.1 t hi- seti f (l the back of his 
neck Hi* t !it.- control panel of the cab (R. 80# 81 f ?i\Gf 
£* - l - O . J £* J-
Thareafter P l a i n t i f f r e p o r t e d s e v e r e and c h r o n i c 
p a i n in t h e r i q h t o c c i p i t a l area of ~\K -*-
r ight i r n r i l pi i ! ion i t * ho neck , * * i-e l a g n t s c a p u l a r 
p o r t i o n iA" t h e back , \\x t he n q h l HI* - ;-> w r i s t , 
£1 ;n d s onie pa i n in t h e 1 \ >w I ¥i c k , n i < 1 111 c ] owe r 
»'X"l rvini i y in HIM t l a m l i f f put i e i g h t h o u r s on 
August ;?, 1972 (R, 86) but was not. a b l e t o e v e r work .' 
a g a i n f.ti the Conijv- I111;i i nt 11 if * , c o n d i t i o n worsened. 
fie had e p i s o d e s of t r e m u l o u s n e s s , r e p o r t e d f u n c t i o n a l 
and p e r s o n a l i t y d i s o r d e r s , wore a r n r v i ^ , 
used a rati* , In I i I a i k i j tsoit-l ype tremor *• :e i i TV f 
hand (R 206 1, dml a f t e r : c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h ^ i ^ e o r ^.^v 
s p e c i a l i s t s , wa ^ re turned In bo* < . • » I, 
J » ' '» «'il itiuinan pertormed a s p i n a l c e r v i c a l f u s i o n 
( k , I 9 " i , ilh3 | 7 7 ) , .-, . . . . ' • ".-
4 
Dr. Bauiitdn saw J. ho Plaint"! ft a f t e r discharge 
May "~ " " < M:out f ivL' Limes, th r l a s t ^n November 
2, i '" ' ( k . 1 ^ * * *• 
hosp i ta l again in September, L "^; *, ?::': •;• rv-t ober, 
1973 (R. 4 9 ) . 
Pl-'iiii " . oenetit « ^ n heard 
by the commit i November - wa ' D I 
down October 4 ^ 
Liast/il upnti
 rt Medical Pane-. 1 Report: f inding: (R. 202, 20 3) 
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 ] , The a p p l i c a n t ' s condit ion s t a b i l i z e d 
s u f f i c i e n t l y , so that the question of permanent 
p a r t i a l d i s a b i l i t y can be de termined, s i x months 
fo l lowing h i s surgery, 
2. The appl icant has 100% permanent im-
pairment of the body and the mind r e s u l t i n g 
from a l l causes , including t he injury sustained 
in the accident of ,Ji i] y 23, 1 972, ' 
There I s 15% permanent I oss of body 
function d i r e c t l y a t t r i b u t a b l e t o the acci dent 
of July 23, 1972, 
4# The remaining permanent physical im-
pairment is attributed to previously exist!ng, 
co-existing and subsequent conditions. 
'.otai temporary disability as a result 
of this accident started when he first missed 
work following July 23, 1972 and continued unt;: 
six months following the surgery performed by 
Dr. Bauman with the exclusion of the minimal 
amount of work that he returned to prior to 
surgery. 
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6. He relates all of his complaints as 
being due to the injury sustained July 23, 
1972 and indicates he was in excellent con-
dition following his first operation and had 
no problems. From a definite determinable 
degree, the Panel is able to only assess 15% 
body impairment to the multiple complaints 
that are impossible to separate into distinct 
entities because of the significant functional 
impairment. 
7. Mr. McPhie does have a significant 
functional component to his problem at the 
present time. 
8. No further surgery is indicated. 
9. Psychiatric treatment would probably 
be beneficial in helping him co-exist and 
adapt to his environment and surroundings, 
and to function better as a person, but would 
not be expected to make him employable. 
10. The only other medical treatment 
that might be considered would be occasional 
examination and follow-up by his attending 
physician, Dr„ Bauman, whom he trusts. This 
would be more in a manner of moral support 
and emotional support, as well as symptomatic 
treatment inasmuch as no specific medical 
treatment, as such, is necessary. 
11. The applicant indicates, at the present 
time, that he is unable to engage in any types 
of activity. He should be able to engage in a 
wider degree of activities with further time, 
elimination of the controversial matters and 
supportive therapy." 
The Commission adopted the Panel's report and 
made, among others, the following Finding of Fact: (R. 227) 
"8. Claimant has 100% permanent impairment 
of his body and mind and resulting from all causes 
6 
and conditions, including the 15% permanent 
partial loss of body function attributable 
to the injury sustained by Claimant in the 
industrial accident of July~23, 1972. The 
difference between the 15% permanent loss 
of body function and the 100% permanent im-
pairment of body and mind is attributable 
to previously existing, co-existing and sub-
sequent conditions either due to accidental 
injury, disease or congenital causes, a 
significant portion of which is attributable 
to a functional component based upon the 
absence of clinical findings to support 
either the nature, severity and duration 
of some of Claimant's continuing complaints. 
The Commission concluded, claimant is entitled 
to workmens1 compensation benefits, as provided by law, 
for the multiple injuries sustained by him in the in-
dustrial accident of July 23, 1972, which accident arose 
out of or was in the course of his employment with 
Defendant United States Steel Corporation. 
The Commission then concluded: (R, 228) 
"Considering Claimant's prior history and 
complaints, and considering the multiple problems 
following the July 23, 1972 accident, the various 
hospitalization, diagnostic efforts and cervical 
surgery were not unreasonable under the circum-
stances. The Medical Panel concluded that much 
of Claimantfs disability was attributable to 
previously existing, co-existing and subsequent 
conditions. They also concluded that it was 
impossible to separate into distinct categories 
the various aspects or components of Claimant's 
permanent impairment because of the significant 
functional component being involved in the 
problem. Since Claimant has complex multiple 
problems not susceptible of reasonable separa-
7 
tion or apportionment, since the problems 
and complaints are consistent with the 
industrial accident of July 23, 1972 and are 
reasonably correlated thereto, and since 
Claimant has undergone cervical surgery 
August 30, 1971 and was later able to return 
to his usual occupation February 15, 1972 and 
continued thereunder until the industrial 
accident of July 23, 1972, it should be con-
cluded that the Defendant, United States 
Steel Corporation, should be responsible 
for the medical treatment of claimant fol-
lowing the July 23, 1972 industrial accident." 
Citing Brown v. Industrial Commission of 
Utah, 29 U. 2d 478, 511 P.2d 743. 
The Industrial Commission entered its award 
which ordered, inter alia: (R. 229) 
"That Defendant shall pay claimant per-
manent partial disability compensation benefits 
at the rate of $59.00 per week for a period 
of 46.8 weeks (being 15%) which entitles 
Claimant to $2,761*20 and which amount shall 
be paid Claimant in a lump sum." 
The Medical Panel referred to a letter dated 
March 11, 1974 to Dr. Boyd G. Holbrook, Panel Chairman, 
from Dr. E. Alan Jeppsen, M.D., College of Medicine, 
University of Utah, Department of Psychiatry. Dr. 
Jeppsen stated, in answering question No. 7 from the 
Industrial commission: 
" Mr. McPhie does have a significant 
functional component to his problem at the 
present time. Mr. McPhie had a chronic 
pain symdrome in 1966 following his accident. 
This predisposed him to have another traumatic 
neurosis develop after his recent injury to 
his cervical spine. I think on top of that, 
8 
his impaired mental functioning predisposed 
him to focus on this limitation as an ex-
planation of his poor functioning. The 
accident of July 23, 1972 would have to be 
considered the precipitating and aggravat-
ing event. Because of Mr. McPhie's condition 
at this point, it would be difficult to work 
out a treatment program for him, however, not 
impossible. With the use of a behavior modifi-
cation in a hospital setting, along with the 
use of hypnosis, it would be possible to 
relieve a certain degree of Mr. McPhie's 
symptoms and to increase his functioning. 
It is, however, doubtful that he would ever 
be able to return to a job. I would not 
recommend psychiatric treatment at this 
time as this type of hospital treatment pro-
gram is not yet available, but may be in the 
near future." (R. 205). 
A letter from Utah State Board of Education, 
Division of Rehabilitation Services, May 7, 1974, to 
the Commission states: 
"In giving consideration to Mr. McPhie 
for a rehabilitation program, it is my de-
finite feeling that he is not medically 
feasible for vocational training or job 
placement. Mr. McPhie is a man advancing 
in age with limited accademic or vocational 
education. As various employment possibili-
ties were mentioned these were eliminated 
because of medical limitations and lack of 
training. Boyd G. Holbrook, M.D., and his 
orthopedic associates spelled out quite 
clearly in their letter the extent of Mr. 
McPhie1s injuries, and because of the poor 
prognosis, I feel it would be useless to try 
to attempt a vocational rehabilitation program 
with a man age 58 with as many physical and 
psychiatric complains and problems as this 
man has. With this man's disability, I feel 
that he should receive whatever compensation 
9 
and disability benefits that he is entitled 
to. I believe he would be a poor risk for 
any type of employment." (R. 219). 
On November 1, 1974 McPhie filed objections to 
(and motion with) the Commission from the final Com-
mission award dated October 25, 1974, and raised the 
following issue: 
"Based upon said Finding and Conclusion, 
the award properly holds United States Steel 
Corporation liable for the 15% permanent loss 
of body function* The award failed to find, 
conclude and hold that the Special Fund pro-
vided for in Sections 35-1-69 and 35-1-68, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, shall 
be required to pay benefits on the basis of 
said statutory liability and for the remain-
ing permanent impairment which is 100%." 
(R. 231-232). 
Thereafter, the Commission denied that motion 
and denied McPhie's Petition for Review, stating: 
"As to the requirement or request of the 
Claimant that an Order be entered against the 
Special Injury Fund, we call the parties 
attention to a parallel case decided by the 
Commission on July 3, 1975 entitled L & M 
O'Driscoll v. United Park City Mines and The 
State Insurance Fund. It is our judgment 
that the McPhie casq is very similar to the 
O'Driscoll case and, having decided against 
O'Driscoll, we see no reason to change 
positions in the case before us#" (R. 238-
239). 
The opinion is reproduced in the Appendix. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE STATUTORY BACKGROUND 
It is well established that an aggravation of 
a pre-existing condition or disability may constitute 
1/ 
a compensable injury under Utah law* An employer is 
liable for permanent total disability resulting from 
2/ 
the last of a series of injuries where Commission find-
ings are based on reasonable evidence that the injury 
complained of is the sole cause of the disability for 
2/ 
which the award is made. 
The problem of apportionment has often caused 
hardships because, while the employee may have been able 
to work with a previous disability, the amount added by 
an industrial accident may effectively prevent him from 
working at all* Some states have adopted apportionment 
4/ 
statutes, Utah does not recognize apportionment. 
1/ Halvorsen, Inc. v. Williams, 19 U.2d 113, 426 P.2d 
1019 
2/ Standard Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 69 U 83, 
252 P.2d 292 
3/ Ifefer's, Inc. v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 526 
P.2d 1088 
4/ Duaine Brown Chevrolet Co. v. Industrial Commission 
of Utah, 29 U.2d 478; citing Larson, Workmans Com-
pensation, §95.31; Nielson v. Industrial Commission, 
120 U 526, 236 P.2d 346. 
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To a s s i s t such an employee, the Utah l eg i s l a tu re 
5 / 
fashioned the combined injury Special Fund. The Special 
Fund i s ava i lab le in ce r t a in cases to make payment to 
previously handicapped workers who have been i ndus t r i a l l y 
injured. Another reason often c i ted for the Fund was to 
encourage employers to h i re handicapped workers, the Fund's 
existence showing the employer tha t he would not be held 
l i ab l e for an employee's e n t i r e condition in the event of 
6/ 
a work injury. 
Second injury funds have been adopted in a l l but 
four states—Georgia, Louisiana, Nevada and Virginia , 
V 
according to Larson, and are c i ted as the solut ion to 
the dilemma of apportionment vs . non-apportionment. 
_5/ §31-1-68 UCA 1953, as amended. The Fund now receives 
$15,600 for each employee k i l l e d , leaving no depen-
dents plus a tax upon insured and se l f - insured car-
r i e r s . 
6/ Larson, Workmans Compensation §59.31 n. 49 
"Within 30 days following the announcement 
of the non-apportionment ru le in Nease v. 
Hughes Stone Co. (244 P 778) between seven 
and eight thousand, one-eyed, one-legged, 
one-armed, and one-handed men were displaced 
in Oklahoma
 #" 
7/ Larson, Workmans Compensation §59.31 n. 51 
12 
The typical second injury statute applies only 
when the subsequent injury added to the prior impair-
ment results in total permanent disability, but about 
one-third of the states, including Utah, omit this 
8/ 
limitation. California has a compromise solution re-
quiring that the degree of final disability be at least 
1/ 
seventy percent. 
35-1-69, the section under appeal, provides: 
"(1) If any employee who has previously 
incurred a permanent incapacity by accidental 
injury, disease, or congenital causes, sustains 
an industrial injury for which compensation and 
medical care is provided by this title that 
results in permanent incapacity which is sub-
stantially greater than he would have incurred 
if he had not had the pre-existing incapacity, 
compensation and medical care, which medical 
care and other related items are outlined in 
section 35-1-81, shall be awarded on the basis 
of the combined injuries, but the liability 
of the employer for such compensation and 
medical care shall be for the industrial in-
jury only and the remainder shall be paid out 
of the special fund provided for in section 35-1-68 
(1) hereinafter referred to as the "special fund." 
A medical panel having the qualifications 
of the medical panel set forth in section 35-2-56, 
shall review all medical aspects of the case and 
determine first, the total permanent physical 
8/ Larson, Workmans Compensation §59.31 n. 53 
9/ California Labor Code, 14751 
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impairment resulting from all causes and 
conditions including the industrial in-
jury? second, the percentage of perman-
ent physical impairment attributable to 
the industrial injury; and third, the per-
centage of permanent physical impairment 
attributable to previously existing con-
ditions whether due to accidental injury, 
disease or congenital causes. The indus-
trial commission shall then assess the 
liability for compensation and medical 
care to the employer on the basis of the 
percentage of permanent physical impair-
ment attributable to the industrial injury 
only and the remainder shall be payable 
out of the said special fund. Amounts, if 
any, which have been paid by the employer 
in excess of the portion attributable to 
the said industrial injury shall be reim-
bursed to the employer out of said special 
fund. 
(2) In addition the commission in 
its discretion may increase the weekly 
compensation rates to be paid out of such 
special fund, such increase to be used for 
the rehabilitation and training of any 
employee coming within the provisions of 
this chapter as may be certified to the 
commission by the rehabilitation depart-
ment of the state board of education as 
being eligible for rehabilitation and 
training; provided, however, that in no 
case shall there be paid out of such 
special fund for rehabilitation an amount in 
excess of $1,000." 
In 1963 an amendment rewrote this section, 
which read: 
"If any employee who has previously 
incurred permanent partial disability 
incurs a subsequent permanent partial 
14 
disability such that the compensation 
payable for the disability resulting 
from the combined injuries is greater 
than the compensation which, except 
for the pre-existing disability would 
have been payable for the latter injury, 
the employee shall receive compensation 
on the basis of the combined injuries, 
but the liability of his employer shall 
be for the latter injury only and the 
remainder shall be paid out of the 
special fund provided for in subdivision 
(1) of section 35-1-68? and in addition 
the commission in its discretion may in-
crease the weekly compensation rates to 
be paid out of such special fund, such 
increase to be used solely for the 
training of any employee coming within 
the provisions of this section as may 
be certified to the commission by the 
rehabilitation department of the state 
board of education as being eligible 
for training? provided, however, that in 
no case shall there be paid out of such 
special fund for rehabilitation an amount 
in excess of $735.00." 
POINT II: THE COMMISSION ERRED BY BASING ITS ORDER 
ON ARBITRARY GUIDELINES, CONTRARY TO LAW 
The impact of the Act seems to say: The per-
manent disability chargeable to the special fund must 
be the result of both the pre-existing condition and the 
subsequent accident and must be "substantially greater" 
than that which would have resulted from the accidental 
injury alone. 
Thus, the amount the Fund contributes would 
usually be the difference between the compensation that 
15 
would be payable for the second injury alone and the com-
pensation payable for the combined injury. 
In this case the special medical panel, authorized 
by statute, established Plaintiff's physical disability 
for the second injury at 15%, the remaining permanent physi-
cal impairment was attributed to previously existing, co-
existing and subsequent conditions of an indeterminable 
degree. He was rated 100% totally disabled from the concept 
of impairment, disability and wage loss. Prior to his second 
injury on July 23, 1972, Plaintiff had been able to work as 
a locomotive engineer at the Geneva Plant, notwithstanding 
his prior condition. Following that injury he was never 
able to work again. 
In denying the Plaintiff benefits under the Special 
Fund, the Commission ruled: 
l !
„ . . t ha t the McPhie case i s very s imilar 
to the O'Driscoll case and having decided 
agains t Mr. O'Driscoll we see no reason to 
change pos i t ions in the case before u s . " (R. 239) 
The complete OfDriscoll opinion appears in the 
Appendix to this brief. 
In 0'Driscoll, the Commission had this to say: 
"The Commission has for years, labored 
with problems of this (35-1-69) section and, 
has endeavored to interpret what constitutes 
Substantially greater.1 The guidelines 
of what 'substantially greater1 means 
16 
are elusive and difficult, even among the 
Commissioners, The Commission has not 
formulated a written policy regarding this 
matter, although in private discussions 
reference has been made to a 50% and a 
40% figure. Said percentages were discus-
sed in terms of the amount of percentage 
the industrial accident had to contribute 
before it became "substantially greater" 
within the meaning intended in the Workmen's 
Compensation law. The Commission had endea-
vored to treat each case individually with 
the idea in mind that each case would stand 
on its own facts, with no particular immov-
able policy being set. To evaluate the 
issue associated with this case, it is 
imperative to return to basic principles 
and endeavor to define the purpose for the 
statute. We believe there are at least two 
primary purposes of Section 35-1-69, Utah 
Code Annotated. First, to encourage the 
hiring of handicapped individuals by limit-
ing the employer's liability to the industrial 
accident only. Second, to distribute the 
responsibility for pre-existing conditions 
on a broader financial base. The broader base 
became the combined injury fund, which is 
funded by all of the insurance carriers and/ 
or self-insured employers. 
In our judgment, the central issue of 
this case is one of social philosophy. When 
an industrial accident is a contributing 
factor to retire a man from the labor market, 
should industry pay the full impact of this 
loss and at what point in the scale of 0 to 100 
does the industrial accident's contribution 
dictate that industry becomes responsible. 
One important guideline is the fact that 
Workmen's Compensation is an insurance funded 
type of program, even though it is social 
legislation, and some principles of insurance 
should be applied in arriving at conclusions. 
To arrive at some standards the State of Utah 
might use, we turn to statutes of other states 
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where similar problems have been reduced to 
statutory designations. Section 4751 of the 
California Code is as follows: 
fIf an employee who is permanently 
partially disabled receives a subsequent 
compensable injury resulting in addi-
tional permanent partial disability so 
that the degree of disability caused by 
the combination of both disabilities is 
greater than that which would have re-
sulted from the subsequent injury alone, 
and the combined effect of the last in-
jury and the previous disability or im-
pairment is a permanent disability equal 
to 70 percent or more of total, he shall 
be paid in addition to the compensation 
due under this code for the permanent 
partial disability caused by the last 
injury compensation for the remainder 
of the combined permanent disability 
existing after the last injury as pro-
vided in this article; provided, that 
either (a) the previous disability or 
impairment affected a hand, an arm, a 
foot, a leg, or an eye, and the permanent 
disability resulting from the subsequent 
injury affects the opposite and corres-
ponding member, and such latter permanent 
disability, when considered alone and 
without regard to, or adjustment for, 
the occupation or age of the employee, 
is equal to 5 percent or more of total, 
or, (b) the permanent disability result-
ing from the subsequent injury, when 
considered alone and without regard to 
or adjustment for the occupation or the 
age of the employee, is equal to 35 per-
cent or more of total.' 
It would appear that in California when 
there are combined permanent partial disabili-
ties, the industrial accident must contribute 
at least 35% or more of the total* In the 
case before us, the applicant's disability 
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due to the industrial accident contributes 
only 15% and, therefore, would not qualify 
under the California Code. Although our 
statute does not specify a' fixed percentage 
for qualification, we believe it reasonable 
in setting our standards to look at other 
statutes for guidance. It would be our 
conclusion that 15% in this particular case, 
does not qualify for the "substantially 
greater" designation even though he is now 
permanently and totally disabled*11 
McPhie is a case of first impression before 
this Court. The Commission's error consists in approach-
ing the problem by applying a social philosophy test and 
the formula of another state (California) which is not 
relevant here. 
Applying O'Driscoll, the Commission asks, why 
"should industry pay the full impact of this case" and 
"at what point in the scale of 0 to 100 does the indus-
trial accident's contribution dictate that industry be-
comes responsible?" Efos the Commission forgotten that the 
entire Fund has been contributed by non-dependency death 
forfeitures and a tax on insurance carriers? Apparently 
so, for it seems unwilling to award any of the fund created 
by a tax on industry. The Commission, anxious to pre-
serve the Fund, is saying that the McPhies and the O'Dris-
colls had better be cared for by welfare or public charity. 
Commission's social philosophy rationale has no place here. 
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Secondly, the Commission conjures up the Calif-
ornia statute as a guide, to arrive at a formula that 
industrial accident must contribute at least 35% or 
more of the total. It holds: "It would be our con-
clusion that 15% in this particular case (O'Driscoll), 
does not qualify for the 'substantially greater1 designa-
tion even though he is now permanently and totally 
disabled." 
The Fund should be liable when the degree of 
disability was made substantially greater by the com-
bination of both injuries. Professor Larson cites several 
cases illustrating how some industrial commissions have 
10/ 
applied the subtrahend calculations. 
10/ Special Indemnity Fund v. Simpson, 349 P.2d 635; 
Columbia Coal Co. v. Griffie, 425 S.W.2d 759? Re-
liance Ins. Co. v. Watts, 293 A.2d 836? Special 
Indemnity Fund v. Wilbanks, 340 P.2d 469 (reversed 
on other grounds)? Subsequent Injuries Fund v. Ind. 
Ace. Comm'n, 348 P.2d 193 (a pre-existing psychi-
atric condition sufficient)? Balash v. Harper, 70 
A.2d 747? Davis v. Conger Life Ins. Co., 201 So.2d 
727? Spencer v. Ind. Comm'n, 87 U 336, 40 P.2d 188 
("The fact that a man has once received com-
pensation as for 50% of total disability does not 
mean that ever after he is, in the eyes of compensa-
tion law, but half a man, so that he can never 
again receive a compensation award going beyond 
the other 50% of the total"). 
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If the Commission is sustained here, every 
worker with greater than 50% prior disability should 
be disqualified for any subsequent injury of 49% or 
less, since the second injury cannot be substantially 
greater arithmatically. Such arbitrary criteria makes 
the statute inoperative. Plaintiff's counsel is not 
aware of a Utah Industrial Commission decision grant-
ing any worker Special Fund benefits. The Commission's 
concern over the Fund's solvency is notable but should not 
be the basis for this denial. 
Here a 58 year old worker is relegated to the 
dump heap because of injuries received in employment in 
1966 and 1972, when combined with other personal physi-
cal conditions. He is tagged as 100% totally and per-
manently disabled, given a magnanimous award of 15%, 
and is told that is all. He is disqualified for life-
time benefits because 15% is not substantially greater 
than 85%. This seems to be moving the Special, Fund in 
reverse of the direction the legislature intended, and 
what common sense dictates. Is it reasonable to hold 
United States Steel liable for only 15% of the dis-
ability, and decree that the remaining 85% is exempt 
21 
from any coverage under an industrially funded pro-
gram? Should public welfare take on this assignment 
also? 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should reverse the Order of the Com-
mission and remand with instructions to find the Plain-
tiff qualified to receive benefits under the Special 
Injury Fund. The Court should further order the 
Commission to bear the Plaintiff's costs and attorney's 
fees in the interest of justice. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. WALLY SSSNDACK 
SANDACK & SANDACK 
A t t o r n e y s f o r P l a i n t i f f 
370 E a s t F i f t h South 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111 
T e l e p h o n e : (801) 531-0555 
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A Supplemental Order was entered in the above 
entitled case by a Hearing Examiner of the Commission on 
February 5, 1975, wherein he affirmed an Order of the 
Commission dated January 22, 1973/ Subsequent to the 
Commission's Order of January 22, 1973, the case was 
appealed to the Supreme Court and later withdrawn. The 
withdrawal of the appeal was to further evaluate the case 
and to have the applicant examined by an Occupational Dis-
ease Panel to determine the extent of the applicant's dis-
ability for an occupational disease. The applicant was 
examined and found by the Panel to be one hundred (100%) 
percent disabled, but not due to an occupational disease. 
The Medical Panel for occupational disease found that he 
had no industrial lung disease, and no primary pulmonary 
disease. 
Pursuant to Section 35-1-82.53, Utah Code Anno-
tated, the case was then referred to the entire Commission 
for review. The Commission has reviewed the case and 
sat in banc to discuss the issues with counsel for the 
applicant. After review of the issues involved, we are 
of the opinion that the Motion for Review should be de-
nied . ' 
The applicant's position is that he is 100% 
permanently and totally disabled, and that he received a 
permanent partial disability as a result of the industrial 
accident, amounting to 15%, and this 15% combining with 
the other infirmities and disabilities h$ has entitles 
him to lifetime benefits under the provisions of Section 
35-1-69, Utah Code Annotated. Said provision allows for 
benefits from the combined injury fund if the injuries 
sustained by the industrial accident is substantially 
greater than he would have had, if he had not had the 
preexisting condition. The Commission has for years, 
labored with the problems of this section, and, has en-
deavored to interpret what constitutes "substantially 
greater. fI The g u i d e l i n e s of w h a t HctlKo+-~~ •»--.•--»-» -
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written policy regarding this matter, although in private 
discussions reference has been made to a 50% and a 40% 
figure. Said percentages were discussed in terms of the 
amount of percentage the industrial accident had to con-
tribute before it became "substantially greater" within 
the meaning intended in the Workmen's Compensation law. 
The Commission has endeavored to treat each case indivi-
dually with the idea in mind that each case would stand 
on its own facts, with no particular immovable policy being 
set* To evaluate the issue associated with this case, it 
is imperative to return to basic principles and endeavor 
to define the purpose for the statute. We believe there 
are at least two primary purposes of Section 35-1-69, Utah 
Code Annotated. First, to encourage the hiring of handi-
capped individuals by limiting the employer's liability 
to the industrial accident only. Second, to distribute 
the responsibility for preexisting conditions on a broader 
financial base. The broader base became the combined in-
jury fund, which is funded by all of the insurance carriers 
and/or self-insured employers. 
In our judgement, the central issue in this case 
is one of social philosophy. When an industrial accident 
is a contributing factor to retire a man from the labor 
market, should industry pay the full impact of this loss 
and at what point in the scale of 0 to 100 does the in-
dustrial accident's contribution dictate that industry be-
comes responsible. One important guideline is the fact 
that Workmen's Compensation is an insurance funded type 
of program, even though it is social legislation, and 
some principles of insurance should be applied in arriving 
at conclusions. To arrive at some standards the State of 
Utah might use, we turn to statutes of other states where 
similar problems have been reduced to statutory desig-
nations. Section 4751 of the California Code is as 
follows: 
"If an employee who is permanently partially 
disabled receives a subsequent compensable injury 
resulting in additional permanent partial disa-
bility so that the degree of disability caused by 
the combination of both disabilities is greater 
than that which would have resulted from the sub-
sequent injury alone, and the combined effect of 
the last injury and the previous disability or 
impairment is a permanent disability equal to 70 
percent or more of total, he shall be paid in 
addition to t.he compensation due under this code 
for the permanent partial disability caused by the 
last injury compensation for the remainder of the 
combined permanent disability existing after the 
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that either (a) the previous disability or impair-
ment affected a hand, an arm, a foot, a leg, or an 
eye, and the permanent disability resulting from 
the subsequent injury affects the opposite and 
corresponding member, and such latter permanent 
disability, when considered alone and without re-
gard to, or adjustment for, the occupation or age 
of the employee, is equal to 5 percent or more of 
total, or (b) the permanent disability resulting 
from the subsequent injury, when considered alone 
and without regard to or adjustment for the occu-
pation or the age of the employee, is equal to 
35 percent or more of total." 
It would appear that in California when there are 
combined permanent partial disabilities, the industrial 
accident must contribute at least 35% or more of the total. 
In the case before us, the applicant's disability due to 
the industrial accident contributes only 15% and, therefore, 
would not qualify under the California Code. Although our 
statute does not specify a fixed percentage for qualifi-
cation, we believe it reasonable in setting our standards 
to look at other statutes for guidance. It would be our 
conclusion that 15% in this particular case, does not 
qualify for the "substantially greater" designation even 
though he is now permanently and totally disabled. 
Applicant also contends the award of the Commission 
dated January 22, 1973 and the Order of the Hearing Ex-
aminer dated February 5, 1975, improperly computes the 
15% disability. With this contention we agree. The 
Award should be based on 15% of 312 weeks or 46.8 weeks 
at $51.20 per week. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the paragraph of 
the Commission's Order dated January 22, 1973 pertaining 
to permanent partial disability in the amount of $1,536.00 
shall be, and is hereby, amended to delete the $1,536.00 
figure to require defendants pay the sum of $2,396.16 in 
lieu thereof. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion for Review 
filed by the applicant in all other respects shall be, and 
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is hereby, denied and the prior Order and Supplemental 
Order of the Commission shall in all other respects be, 
and is hereby, affirmed. ' x" 
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